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Crisis of Democracy and Modern Fundamentalism: A Reflection of Karl Popper's Critical Rationalism

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Abstract:
The emergence of fundamentalism in modern society calls for an understanding of it as well as the development of practical countermeasures. The theoretical and practical solution to this issue begins with Karl Popper's critical rationalism. This article's primary goal is to evaluate Karl Popper's critical rationalism approach in light of the fundamentalist phenomenon as a manifestation of democracy's dilemma. To do this, the concepts of "fundamentalism" and "crisis of democracy" will be covered in the first section. The previously indicated procedure will then be presented in the second section. It is stated that Popper's contributions to epistemology and his body of work constitute a critical turning point in the preservation of a democratic vision that places a premium on open and responsible discourse with others.

Keywords: Crisis of democracy; fundamentalism; critical rationalism; Karl Popper; freedom; open society.

Introduction

The increasing rise of fundamentalism is already a global concern. Although some authors have identified this problem, when associated with the crisis of democracy, it is possible to see a sharper and more clear growth in recent years. Nevertheless, this article will not exclusively examine that concept. This has already been done from various angles. One, perhaps the most important, is the text by Ruthven (2007), where the author shows the polysemy of a term that encompasses political and religious processes from east to west, from antiquity to contemporary. We will come back to this later. Thus, instead of taking that path, the present reflective and conceptual study will examine the conditions that make possible the opposition to this phenomenon. This will be done starting with Karl Popper's critical rationalism, which is one of the key concepts in the conceptualization of democracy.

Popper's philosophy is based on a suspicion of any tendency that purports to offer a comprehensive, dogmatic, holistic picture of reality. Error and refutation are commonplace when it comes to thinking and humanity in general. In the lines that follow, the concept will be developed. Estay Sepúlveda and Lagomarsino Montoya (2016) assert, posing comparable queries, that a critical stance motivated by Karl Popper's work needs to be raised to preserve democracy and open societies in the modern era. Fundamentalism is a component of this program and needs to be considered in any discussion about the state of democracy today. The steps that need to be taken here are as follows: first, broaden the definition of fundamentalism; second, place the process of its emergence within a more complex environment that we refer to as the crisis of democracy, which includes the rise of new forms of nationalism, populism, and

authoritarianism; third, study the ontological dimension of the crisis that fundamentalism poses in addition to institutional analysis; and fourth, Karl Popper's critical rationalism could be the starting point of a dual epistemological and social program against the spread of more dogmatic positions. It is presumed that research on all of this combined needs to be done somewhere else. Only the final element will be discussed here, mostly because it is crucial and necessary in today's world. This article's goal is to examine Karl Popper's application of critical rationalism in opposition to fundamentalism as a manifestation of democracy's problem.

The analysis suggests dividing the arguments and differentiating the concepts according to their attributes. Through this process, the researcher might look within concepts and categories to identify novel connections that help to comprehend and counteract the social aspects of fundamentalism. Thus, when Hanna Arendt states in Understanding and Politics, "This is, however, but one side of the matter," it will be difficult to ignore her inspiration. Since we do not yet have a complete understanding of totalitarianism and cannot hope to acquire one until it has been decisively defeated, we cannot wait to take action against it (Arendt 1994: 309).

Fundamentalist instances are not exclusive to the religious sphere (Giddens 1996). These days, it is a broad notion with elements from the social, political, and cultural spheres as well. As such, it poses a risk to both the open society and its members. More than ever, the social sciences, philosophy, and all scientific narratives concerned in the critical debate of the social reality must reflect on this stark contrast between fundamentalism and an open society. Stated differently, "totalitarianism and fundamentalism are static and ill; open society, democracy, and change are dynamic and healthy" (Estay Sepúlveda and Lagomarsino Montoya 2016: 83).

To fully grasp Karl Popper's potential contribution to the struggle against fundamentalism, this essay will first define the terms "crisis of democracy" and "fundamentalism." Arguments from several perspectives will be discussed in the first section to provide a general definition of fundamentalism. The term is not limited to the historical discourse that dates its origins to the beginning of the 20th century in American Protestantism, Islamic fundamentalism, or any other particular era. Here, an ontological conceptual inquiry is preferred, without discounting its richness. Karl Popper's critical rationalism approach, one of the paradigms in modern social science and epistemology, will next be covered in the second portion. We will go over the key points of that approach as well as other crucial ideas that are pertinent to the fight against fundamentalism.

Karl Popper did not always get everything right. That task, though, goes beyond what these sentences are intended to accomplish. Suárez-Iñiguez (2008) argues that despite partial readings, concepts that could have been interpreted differently, or overly strict conceptualizations, his epistemological program could serve as a foundation or manual for democratic action centered around accountability, freedom, and criticism.

Crisis of Democracy and Contemporary Fundamentalism

There is evidence that a surprisingly high degree of receptivity to non-democratic systems of government exists in many countries, even though democracy is still a highly supported ideology among people from all over the world.

More than 20% of people in the US, Italy, the UK, Hungary, Japan, and South Korea think it could be a good idea to have a strong leader in charge (Wike & Fetterrolf 2018). However, for the past 25 years, democracy research has demonstrated that people in Central and Eastern European nations express the

greatest levels of discontent with how democracy operates in their nations (Vlachová 2019; Karp & Milazzo 2015). Not to mention the extreme political division in Spain and the crisis facing the French government, which has resulted in months of strikes and protests throughout Europe. In addition, the rise of nationalism in nations like Germany, France, and Hungary. Later, attention should be paid to Viktor Orbán, who can now rule by decree for an indefinite period following the coronavirus crisis (Serhan 2020). If we combine all of the aforementioned factors with the extremely unlikely likelihood that the EU will be able to provide a definitive solution to the Balkan problem, its lack of leadership in the face of all these conflicts, the problematic relations with Russia, and the still-to-be-determined relationship with the United States under Donald Trump, the outlook is not good.

It's not any less depressing in Latin America. The year 2019 closed as one of the most politically tumultuous in the region. Economic instability and the growing public view of democracy's terrible state are added to this. According to data from Latinobarómetro's 2018 report, the region has not seen much development, except Bolivia, where 44% of respondents felt that there had been an improvement, followed by 33% in Chile and the Dominican Republic. Less than one-third of people in the remaining countries thought that their country had made progress. (Latinobarómetro Corporation 2018: 4;). This, however, is in contrast to the political crises that still lack a definitive resolution in 2019's first two countries, Chile and Bolivia. The same survey states that "economic hardship and crime"—rather than politicians—are Latin Americans' top concerns (Corporación Latinobarómetro 2018: 5). According to economic indicators, Chile is "the winner," with only 16% of its citizens reporting that their financial situation is dire, followed by Bolivia with 18%. However, Chile performs lower than the region's average on equity indices, such as income distribution (Corporación Latinobarómetro 2018: 10). The report concludes that there are no large winners in the economy, which leaves a void in legitimacy that is filled by political authoritarianism and fundamentalism in several social spheres.

According to a poll conducted in the spring of 2018 by the Pew Research Center across 27 countries, more people worldwide are unhappy than content with how democracy functions in their respective nations (Castillo, A., Huang, Ch. & Silver, L.: 2018). Furthermore, it was claimed that the low level of protection for free speech and the nation's poor economic performance were linked to unhappiness. Consider Brazil as an example. At that time, 9% of people there felt that their economic circumstances were favorable, while 83% stated they were dissatisfied with the way democracy operated in their nation.

In their analysis of the United States, Levitsky and Ziblatt (2018) follow a similar path. Both writers' working hypothesis is that the election of an authoritarian leader like Donald Trump in the northern nation is an expression of the democratic crisis. The goal of the research is to determine why authoritarian activities can occur in a democratic society as well. The notion of democracy is taken for granted in this work and is defined as "a system of government with regular, free, and fair elections, in which all adult citizens have the right to vote and possess basic civil liberties such as freedom of speech and association" (8). Not that one, but rather how citizens might select an authoritarian leader while formally adhering to the concept's qualities is the crucial point. To do this, the authors identify Four Key Indicators of Authoritarian Behavior: the opponent's refusal to acknowledge any legitimacy; their open willingness to restrict opponents' civil liberties, including those of the media; and their rejection of the democratic rules of the political game, expressed in words or deeds.

One of the research's most important findings is that it makes clear how the rise of violence, intolerance, fundamentalism, and populism is connected to democracy's decline (Mudde & Kaltwasser 2017; Levitsky & Ziblatt 2018).

Countless other instances of the crisis in democratic discourse may be cited (Gensollen & Salazar 2018), including the development and appearance of radicalism and fundamentalism as well as actions taken by governments, parties, legislatures, and individual citizens. Beyond these facts, though, there are issues with democracy itself (Merkel 2014). This situation highlights the lack of theoretical knowledge on the part of each individual as well as the several definitions that exist, contributing to its complexity during a historical period when data and information are more than our bodies, minds, and spirits can handle. Regarding the term's polysemy—that is its ability to be regarded as a value, a method, an institution, or just a kind of relationship—the book Democracia y Conocimiento (Estany & Gensollen 2018) provides a rather clear road map.

The question therefore becomes: Is democracy experiencing a crisis right now, or has it always experienced crises? When presented with a subject comparable to this and a reality this complicated, Merkel (2014) reminds us that there have been at least three discussions on the problem of democracy. Initially, the public perceives it as a crisis of trust in political parties, governments, political elites, and legislatures; this ultimately results in a crisis of democracy as a whole. Second, the discussions that regard the crises as a component of the idea itself. Naturally, there is a wide range of intellectuals among them; among the most significant are Plato, Aristotle, Thomas Hobbes, Alexis de Tocqueville, Karl Marx, Max Weber, Jürgen Habermas, and Chantal Mouffe. And lastly, a series of discussions resulting from empirical studies on democracy. (Merkel 2014: 12).

In addition to the aforementioned, it is believed that the crisis represents more than just a particular historical period. Both the crises and the broad, abstract nature of a concept like democracy are unavoidable. Does this mean that there can never be a definition? No.

However, it prompts us to consider the inevitability of variation within it. In a strict sense, this diversity even provides a good sampling of what a crisis entails.

The fact that a crisis can mean different things cannot be overlooked. A particular temporal sense as well as the notion of a rapid change or metamorphosis, of something unfathomable and possibly even apocalyptic, lurk beneath the layers and ambiguity of this term. Because medical language is detrimental to our psychological well-being, there is a remedy for this dilemma. Since 1780, there has been a rise in the later chaotic tendency in sociohistorical discourse (Koselleck & Richter 2006). It has evolved into a phrase used to emphasize and signal the end of an era.

But behind these ideas, the idea's two original meanings are still present. The Greek verb κρίνω (krino), which means to separate, decide, judge, pick, measure, and fight, is the world's root. These distinctions—the term's deep Derridean importance (Derrida 1972) should not be overlooked here—create a wide range of interpretations that converge on two important schools of thought. "Subjective criticism" on the one hand, and "objective crisis" on the other. Since the "crisis" was a concept that required justice and the political order to be harmonized by suitable legal choices, its use will have relevance in the political order (Koselleck & Richter 2006: 359).

The democratic crisis indicates a division and an overabundance of senses that need to be understood, rather than a dreadful dominance. Moreover, this crisis is a process—which is never simple—of having to make decisions about how to treat the Other. The responsibility that each decision carries with it contributes to its subjective density. This justification highlights the significance of understanding democracy as a notion that prioritizes the relationship between the self and the Other over all other political considerations, encompassing not only objective processes, institutions, elections, political parties, and even principles. Put differently, democracy is defined as "a process of collective decision-making that is

typified by a certain degree of equality among the participants at a crucial juncture in the process" (Christiano 2018).

It might seem preferable to jump straight to social ontology's potential solutions to our issue after that definition, which highlights the agency of the subjects, the collective character of the activity, and the link between individuals. According to Frega, social ontology is a critical debate on the fundamental categories that form our conception of reality. Its objective is to explain the basic components, social dynamics, and organizational frameworks of social existence. First, I argue that political theory requires a social ontology more than a political one (Frega 2019: 158). Consequently, it is believed that the ontological turn in modern political theory and the requirement to closely examine its commitments to the social are essential to solving the democratic crisis (Rosenthal 2019). While avoiding the intricate routes that Searle's concept of social ontology suggests, a few concepts aid in our comprehension of the democratic dilemma. Thus, the democratic crisis is a subclass of social facts, and as such, it requires the idea of collective intentionality. The latter is defined as "the intentionality that is shared by different people; in the same way that shared beliefs and desires can exist, so can shared intentions to do things." When a church congregation recites the Nicene Creed, for instance, they are communicating a common faith and shared belief (Searle 2006: 56). Put simply, every procedure, institution, or act that involves my deliberate involvement is an act that is made up of the collective.

The two primary schools of thought in social ontology are those that emphasize holistic character and atomism. According to atomistic views, supra-individual occurrences are explained by individuals as well as by their intentions and deeds. The holistic approach, on the other hand, is predicated on the structures' larger significance. Because of this, the explanation's order is reversed, highlighting concepts like the interplay between ideologies, sociological traits, and socioeconomic determinants. But the issue needs to be viewed beyond any binary opposition between people and things, ideas, and structures. Frega (2019: 62) states that due to the dominance of these two trends, the normative significance of social interaction patterns has been obscured and either attributed to the collective impact of individual actions or beliefs or inferred as a structural outcome of the functioning of formal political institutions.

The range of ontological ideas is not entirely exhausted by atomism and holism; rather, it is limited to substantial ontologies. That is, the distillation of the examined problem to its essence—be it these people or these systems. Another model, interactionist ontologies, must stand in opposition to substantive ontologies. The latter also operates under the presumption that interactions and relationships are more important than content. These are the two obstacles that a relational social ontology of democracy actively works to overcome. This necessitates demonstrating how the "democratic" predicate can be applied in a normative sense that is pertinent to social interaction patterns in addition to individual and structural attributes. The latter provides sufficient legitimacy to comprehend that the issue facing democracy is not limited to the crisis of the individual or a particular value, such as the denial of rights or the corruption of institutions. There's more to it than that. The possibility of recognizing a theme in the crisis that also affects the entire field of the collectivity of the self and the other, the exclusive area where political action takes place, is what social ontology puts in front of the subject. Because of this, a democratic crisis does not always indicate the presence of particular behaviors, patterns, or forms—much less, contrary to what might seem from the foregoing, a lack of group intentionality. In any event, the issue is that the behavior is not what was anticipated, or even that the intentionality of the group suggests that it is being attacked. Fundamentalism is an example of the latter.

Fundamentalism is currently employed as a pejorative adjective in its immediate sense. It is a predicate that is usually invariably ascribed to the Other rather than to the individual. When the debate comes to an end because of violence, fanaticism, or adherence to some illogical belief, one is considered fundamentalist in a very general and abstract sense. But it's important to acknowledge the history of a term this complicated, primarily because it hasn't always been used unfavorably.

In the early 20th century, the theological setting of Protestant America gave rise to fundamentalism. The phrase "fundamentalists were those who are ready to do battle royal for The Fundamentals" was first used in 1920 by Curtis Lee Laws in the Baptist Watchman-Examiner journal (Ruthven 2007: 8). The narrative starts in 1910 when Milton and Lyman Stewart started a five-year sponsorship project to complete several pamphlets that would subsequently be given away for free. The goal of this material, titled The Fundamentals: A Testimony of Truth, was to halt the erosion of "the fundamental beliefs of Protestant Christianity: the inerrancy of the Bible; the direct creation of the world and humanity ex nihilo by God; the authenticity of miracles; the virgin birth of Jesus, his crucifixion and bodily resurrection; substitute atonement (the doctrine that Christ died to redeem the sins of humanity); and his imminent return to judge and rule the world" (Ruthven 2007: 7).

In any case, it is important to acknowledge that the term has been overused to refer to Islamic fundamentalism, particularly since the Twin Towers attack. Additionally, depending on who judges, there are additional uses such as feminist, environmental, Jewish, and Marxist fundamentalism, among others. The most well-known of them all is Islamic fundamentalism. The word "fundamentalism" is used to characterize Islam as the antithesis of violent doctrine, bigotry, and religious extremism both overtly and implicitly in modern times. The latter, however, is only achievable if the phrase is limited to everyday usage and the media (Toku 2015). Boer (2005) questions how such a diverse range of religious groups could have been described from the positive genesis, given that his history was constructed in the United States at the start of the 20th century. He responds to this question by reminding us that the original movement was characterized by the same cultural, social, and economic conditions as the first post-war era, which was marked by several transformations and dizzying changes meant to advance capitalist development and increase liberties (Boer 2005: 20). Commentators who labeled these later movements as fundamentalist took advantage of the rejection of the allure of liberal, educated, capitalist modernity as the meeting place with a variety of non-Western religions (Boer 2005: 21). Ultimately, and not without irony, the writer remembers exactly what this term's paradox is:

The paradox is that whereas within the United States, politicians must ensure the fundamentalist vote (presidential candidates often declare themselves to be "born again" Christians), when the fundamentalists are external, they become a threat to Western society. Thus, terrorism against the United States, England, and Australia is the act of so-called fundamentalists, but internal terrorism is not (Boer 2005: 21).

It is important to acknowledge that the phrase's meaning and expressions now extend beyond the religious realm, even while acknowledging the historical complexity that such a concept may have. On the other hand, the reverence of a text, which, broadly speaking, can be practically any group of standards that are taken for granted as revealed and not subject to critical inquiry, reflects the same logic that underlies the reduction of a set of features to a particular dogma. Not only is it a question of simplifying or rigidly following the text, but it also manifests as the denigration and rejection of the Other that stands before me. This philosophical phenomenon also suggests that tradition is being reaffirmed from the inside, without attempting to make any of its components compatible with the present or the future. Therefore,

fundamentalism is the antithesis of true creativity and is an attack on all responsible and creative freedom. It is also known as false freedom. That is to say, it validates an absolute personality that ought to be revered and worshipped as the expression of unproven liberty.

It is dangerous to democracy in all these ways, and when its reasoning is applied to the extreme, it becomes an even greater menace. Another way political fundamentalism manifests itself is when someone blindly and unquestioningly accepts a text's literalness as a belief or standard. A reduction that seeks to eliminate the complexity of the social domain and, by extension, of all collective activity also exists in politics. The essence of democracy is found in several concerns that fundamentalism ignores, in addition to the obvious fact that diversity is the only thing that makes democracy concrete. For instance, the diverse and helpful information regarding the issues up for decision-making, the security, and skill of the decision-makers, the Other, from whom some criticisms are required to accomplish a shared objective, and last but not least, dialogue in its widest and most inclusive sense. It is just as catastrophic to envision a society devoid of conversation as it is to envision a society devoid of social responsibility for the Other. Considering that democracy is a crucial idea for the full social and vital spectrum, in addition to political life, one can now see the true scope of the crisis facing democracy and the areas that would require finding a solution. According to Giddens:

Fundamentalism is essentially a means of authenticating tradition and therefore is not specifically linked to religion. It is an outlook in some sense in genuine dialogue with the presuppositions of industrial capitalist civilization. It poses the question 'Can we live in a world where nothing is sacred?' Fundamentalism is not always dangerous to others, but can easily become so. For it implies a refusal of dialogue, a justification of tradition that resists discursive engagement with others (Giddens 1996: 215).

Karl Popper and His Theory of Critical Rationalism:

One should refer to Karl Popper's work under the presumptions that were established in the previous section. It shall be demonstrated here that its usefulness is found in the critical rationalism scientific process. His approach, when combined with the earlier discussions of fundamentalism, democracy, open societies, and the crisis of democracy, can provide a foundation for understanding where we are in the modern world. Karl Popper was born in Vienna on July 28, 1902, attended the University of Vienna, and was awarded a doctorate for his dissertation Die Methodenfrage der Denkpsychologie in 1928. He briefly had ties to Marxism and was active in the Association of Students of Socialist Schools when he was younger. But based on his testimony (Popper, 1976), he soon lost faith in the organization due to its doctrinal orientation and turned away from it completely. His concentration on publications on social and political philosophy began with the 1938 annexation of Austria, which resulted in the 1945 publication of The Open Society and Its Enemies. In 1949, he was appointed Professor of Logic and Scientific Method at the University of London. A year later, he relocated to England to lecture at The London School of Economics. From then on, he wrote more of his works and saw a significant increase in his prestige and reputation as a social thinker and philosopher of science. In 1959, The Logic of Scientific Discovery was released. His emphasis on the logic of falsification led to philosophical criticism of him in subsequent years. Popper continued to work as a writer and professor until he died in 1994, even after being knighted in 1965 and leaving the University of London in 1969.

The legitimacy of Karl Popper's idea is the first issue with it. Can Karl Popper offer anything pertinent regarding the above-mentioned definition of fundamentalism? The solution is not that easy. Karl Popper first addresses issues related to science, methodology, and epistemology from which he then draws

conclusions that are pertinent to the social and political sciences. He supported the hypothetical deductive approach to scientific inquiry, which assumes theories without providing any prior evidence before testing them rigorously. This is the starting point for the deconstruction of fundamentalism and the location from which his proposal may be more easily understood.

It's also important to consider the theoretical and historical context in which his work is situated. The development of psychoanalysis and the advancements in physics throughout the first part of the 20th century are noteworthy from an epistemic perspective. His best ally and source of inspiration for his ideas came from the Austrian school, of which Hayek was a buddy. His findings on epistemology were published in Popper's 2002 book The Logic of Scientific Discovery. Two issues are the focus of this work: the induction problem and the demarcation and interaction problem. Falsification was used in place of induction as the strategy. About the latter, the notion that universal theories cannot be deduced from propositions is the most pertinent. This takes us back to the induction issue and implicitly criticizes positivism by taking all truth value out of the positive fact.

Another issue Popper raises in The Logic of Scientific Discovery is the demarcation dilemma. In other words, how can science be distinguished from logic and mathematics on the one hand, and metaphysics on the other? Theories cannot be confirmed by observation since they are systems of universal propositions. He disapproves of all forms of inductive reasoning, unlike Hume. According to David Hume, the challenge of induction stems from the inability to confirm something's universality using information taken from experience. Because there will always be a single instance that might demonstrate the contrary, theories cannot be validated in this manner. This served as a refutation of the Vienna Circle thinkers' positivist viewpoint as well.

Now it is far from obvious, from a logical point of view, that we are justified in inferring universal statements from singular ones, no matter how numerous; for any conclusion drawn in this way may always turn out to be false: no matter how many instances of white swans we may have observed, this does not justify the conclusion that all swans are white. The question of whether inductive inferences are justified, or under what conditions, is known as the problem of induction (Popper 2002: p.4).

He makes this point quite clearly in his intellectual autobiography when he describes how the demarcation problem came to be. As per Popper's 1976 account, the concept first surfaced in 1919 and pertained to Einstein's theories. His infatuation with scientists and his subsequent rejection of Adler, Marx, and Freud are well known. He believed that the psychoanalytic theories had been articulated in a way that allowed for verification. On the other hand, if the testable implications of Einstein's theory were out to be incorrect, it would have refuted the theory itself. He is also guided against his interpretation of Marxism and other types of what he refers to as historicism by this dose of honesty and clarity in the direction of the scientific spirit.

There was an attitude utterly different from the dogmatic attitude of Marx, Freud, Adler, and even more so that of their followers. Einstein was looking for crucial experiments whose agreement with his predictions would by no means establish his theory; while a disagreement, as he was the first to stress, would show his theory to be untenable (Popper 1976: 38).

However, psychoanalysis did not result in this. The author argues that the essential idea behind security is that it is derived almost entirely from myths from antiquity, in which everything fits together and there is an almost limitless capacity to accept and explain any conceivable variation of human behavior. Psychoanalysis made accommodations for the theory to ensure that there were no cracks, while Einstein tested his postulates and so put the entire theory in danger. According to Miguel A. Schmucke:

The human intellect has the possibility of approaching the truth by carrying out a critical examination of the theories, that is, exposing them to falsification. The critical attitude commits the researcher to fight against the tendency to error. Criticism also commits the scientist to the use of simple language, devoid of any assumption that makes it difficult for the layman to understand the subject, which is contrary to the true nature of science, that is, the search for truth; the goal of falsification is to avoid scientific dogmatism and promote intellectual sincerity (Schmucke 2006).

The Open Society and its Opponents is a treatise that critiques political systems and their intellectual foundations found in the works of Plato, Hegel, and Marx. In that passage, he describes an open society as one in which people can voice their opinions to the government and are held accountable for their actions. Popper believed that the fundamental tenet of democracy is that institutions are set up so that citizens can overthrow governments peacefully. Humanism and reason must form the foundation of an open society, which is another crucial requirement. Because men in the gated society lack self-confidence and place all of their agency and will in the politically determined social paradise, this is the reason. The capacity to question and react to government orders and regulations is vital to an open society. The ability for a norm to be challenged and questioned, rather than an abstraction developed by one man or group of men, is what gives it value.

This advises substituting essential questions for justification questions in politics, just as it does in science. Rather than posing the conventional query, "Who should govern?" The question of how to set up mechanisms to remove unscrupulous leaders should be asked by the populace. Popper also defined utopian social engineering, which is the process of reconstructing society to create an ideal state. Utopian engineering can result in a dictatorship and demolish current systems. He almost always refers to the idea of holistic social engineering when he discusses it, as opposed to his suggestion of piecemeal social engineering. One of the most significant themes of his seminal work is the contrast between the two: "...the historicist understands politics as a science of immutable historical tendencies, whereas the social engineer conceives as the scientific basis of politics something like a social technology (Plato, as we shall see, compares it with the scientific background of medicine)" (Popper 2011: 21). On the other hand, fragmented social engineering is described as:

The only course open to the social sciences is to forget all about the verbal fireworks and to tackle the practical problems of our time with the help of the theoretical methods which are fundamentally the same in all sciences. I mean the methods of trial and error, of inventing hypotheses that can be practically tested, and of submitting them to practical tests. A social technology is needed whose results can be tested by piecemeal social engineering (Popper 2011: 428).

In light of everything that has been discussed thus far and the importance of these epistemological tenets in the development of political philosophy, the idea of freedom ought to be at the core of democracy. This also implies the notion of evaluating and critiquing the behavior of people and organizations. Put differently, democracy is only a form of governance where the right to free speech is protected by non-violent methods (Popper 2011: 118). This is analogous to how reasoned critique in science verifies the veracity of a certain theory.

But other, marginally more complicated circumstances can also trigger a fundamentalist moment. That is instances where citizens overuse their freedom to the point of dogma, in defiance of the standards set forth for the exercise of choice and control. This is the reason this definition should not be seen as an unchangeable precept but rather as a set of guidelines that others must reason through. Drawing from Popper, one may argue that believing democracy to be limited to the majority's rule is equally problematic.

This kind of administration could lead to paradoxes like the establishment of authoritarian leaders who are elected on the exact basis of democratic institutions and the deterioration of the government's institutions. Popper also brings up the paradox of freedom and tolerance in addition to the latter, which is referred to as the paradox of democracy. First, there is the notion that freedom—defined as the lack of any restraint—must result in extreme restraint since it gives the bully the ability to oppress the meek (Popper 2011: 581). Furthermore, it states in the second one that "...unlimited tolerance must lead to the disappearance of tolerance." The tolerant will perish along with tolerance if we offer unrestricted tolerance to the intolerant and if we are not ready to protect a tolerant society against the attack of the intolerant (Popper 2011: 581).

The answer to these paradoxes is to always set boundaries for people who are prepared to tolerate intolerance regardless of the potential consequences. Put another way, just as a democratically elected authoritarian government cannot have unrestricted power over its people, neither can it be justified to put up with the intolerant or the person who uses their rights to impose their will on others. In each of these instances, the reality that prevails in many nations across the world today is described with some degree of accuracy. But the real issue is figuring out how to put this system of ongoing checks and balances on policies and administrations into place. From everything mentioned above, fresh concepts that are pertinent to reassessing a democratic paradigm that opposes fundamentalism must be gleaned.

Conclusion:

These ideas must drive any resistance to political fundamentalism. First, free citizens with the ability to act, think, choose, decide, deliberate, criticize, or reject are involved in democracy as a technique or decision-making process. Any of these activities require a safe environment free from outside threats to the decision-making process and where the subjects can act as they like. As we've seen, the fallibility of all claims is now one of the fundamental principles.

If this is to be interpreted as a principle, then every action needs to follow it. This implies that fallibility is a prerequisite for the possibility of political action, but it does not imply that everything is true or prone to error.

Furthermore, the aforementioned suggests that truth is not a conclusive argument that correlates with experience right away. Every story or political discourse that advocates for freedom—both from the utopian rescue and from the truth that needs to be exposed—always assumes that truth is related to some external reality. As the relationship between an object and a subject, the concept of connection is associated with the traditional understanding of truth.

Popper's logical critique of this view of truth is in opposition to it; it derives its value from the examination and ongoing evidence to which it is subjected.

Rationality refers to a set of rules and regulations that provide a sequential explanation for the phenomena. Since every social network has its own set of rules and regulations that we as a group decide upon, what has been said above indicates that the truth corresponds not with individuality but rather with the ability for acts or proposals to be put to the test by the laws of that particular system. To put it succinctly, the relationship between the two is what matters most, not the correspondence.

It's comparable to what Searle (2006) says about the notion of group intentionality:

First, a noteworthy ability shared by many other creatures with humans is the ability to share attitudes and behave cooperatively with particular details. One only needs to watch any ordinary human encounter to see the variety of ways in which humans might work together... In particular, purposeful collective activity

is crucial to any conception of society. In these situations, all I am doing is participating in what we are doing (Searle 2006: 56).

The introduction of acts into society implies a contrast and a mystery that are difficult to reconcile with the first person's uniqueness. Therefore, it is not difficult to include Popper's concept of critical rationalism in this approach. A subject's choice, volition, and agency are not limited to those who are socially or politically isolated from other subjects. Every choice must always be made with one's relationship to oneself in mind. It takes both academic and practical approaches to challenge modern fundamentalism. Then, from an epistemological perspective, Popper is introduced to serve as a link between both, demonstrating the usefulness of critical rationalism as a supplement to a democratic notion that places a premium on open and accountable discourse with others.

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