International Journal For Multidisciplinary Research

E-ISSN: 2582-2160   •   Impact Factor: 9.24

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User-Driven Online Advertisement Auctions: A Game Theoretic Analysis

Author(s) Jwalin Thaker
Country United States
Abstract With a paradigm shift happening to the Internet, its architecture is transitioning from Web2.0 to Web3.0. Major highlights of this new system are key emphasis on user privacy, data security and decentralization. Centered around user privacy, this paper is a summary of research performed around online auctioning mechanisms, especially digital advertisements (ads), and how they would adapt to this change. Because the power to release data will shift towards the user, is it imperative to understand what changes an Ad agency or service provider would have to implement, to tailor personalized ads and keep website traffic afloat. Conventional advertisement auctioning is structured around the search engine provider (auctioneer) auctioning ad spots, which are bid in real-time by goods/service providers (bidders). The work here extends that model by introducing a third entity, the “user”, its preferences, and how they drive the auction, by influencing bidder preferences. The goal is to model the problem under “Game theory”, as a Stackelberg leadership game, and perform simulated trials of Vickrey auctions to record the trend on ad spot allocation and auction payments with changing user preferences.
Keywords Web3.0, Auction, Advertisements, Game Theory, Neural Networks, Revenue Maximization, Constraints, Preferences, Vickrey Auction, Stackelberg Game, Security, Privacy, Decentralization
Field Engineering
Published In Volume 5, Issue 3, May-June 2023
Published On 2023-05-11
DOI https://doi.org/10.36948/ijfmr.2023.v05i03.38545
Short DOI https://doi.org/g88g9t
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